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This paper investigates the determinants of the takeover of a foreign bank
by a domestic bank, whereby the former becomes a branch of the latter, and
its welfare e¤ects for both the domestic and the foreign country. The analysis
is based on a model of a bank that is supervised by an agency that cares about
closure costs plus deposit insurance payouts. The agency uses supervisory
information to decide on the early closure of the bank. Under the principle
of home country control, the takeover moves responsibility for both supervision
of the foreign branch and insurance of the foreign deposits to the domestic
country. It is shown that the takeover is more likely to happen if the foreign
bank is small (relative to the foreign market) and if its investments are riskier
than those of the domestic bank. Moreover, the takeover (whenever it happens)
is in general welfare improving for both countries.
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During the 1990’s a very large process of banking consolidation has taken place in
both Europe and the United States. Although most of the action so far has occurred
within the domestic markets, there have been a signi…cant number of cross-border
mergers. This process is expected to accelerate in the near future. In particular,
many analysts seem to believe that (especially in Europe) large banks have no choice
but to pursue cross-border merger strategies.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the takeover of
a foreign bank by a domestic bank, and its welfare e¤ects for both the domestic
and the foreign country. The main result of the paper is that the takeover is more
likely to happen if the foreign bank is small (relative to the foreign market) and if
its investments are riskier than those of the domestic bank. In addition, the takeover
(whenever it happens) is in general welfare improving for both countries.
The theoretical literature on this area is very small. In the case of domestic bank
mergers, the three main motives discussed in the literature are economies of scale and
scope (including “too big to fail” economies of scale), increases in market power, and
risk diversi…cation. Of these reasons, the …rst two are probably not very relevant for
cross-border mergers. Economies of scale and scope have been empirically di¢cult to
…nd for large domestic banks, and the synergies are likely to be much smaller in the
case of cross-border deals. On the other hand, the takeover of a foreign bank does
not increase marker power in either the domestic or the foreign market. So it seems
that in order to explain international takeovers in banking one should focus on the
risk diversi…cation motive.
In order to assess the importance of this motive one should note that banks are no
ordinary …rms. In particular, they have to be licensed by a competent authority, they
are subject to strict capital requirements, and some of their liabilities are insured.
Moreover, they are supervised by some government agency (which may or may not
be the central bank). In this paper we argue that a proper understanding of the
risk diversi…cation motive for international takeovers in banking requires taking into
account the regulatory and supervisory framework that characterizes the activity of
banks.
International banks have two modes of operation in host countries. They can
1operate via branches (which form a legally dependent part of the home institution)
or via subsidiaries (which are separate foreign banks owned by the home institution).
According to the Core Principles for E¤ective Banking Supervision (Basle Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision, 1997) the home supervisor should be in charge of the
consolidated supervision of their international banks, including overseas branches and
subsidiaries. However, the host supervisor is also involved in the case of subsidiaries,
since a subsidiary is a registered bank in the host country.
When the international bank owns a subsidiary in a host country, its deposits
in this country are insured according to the host country regulation. The situation
with regard to deposit insurance is less clear when the international bank opens a
branch in a host country. Usually, host authorities require the international bank’s
deposits in the host country to be covered by the same guarantees as the deposits
of domestic banks. For instance, the 1994 European Directive on deposit-guarantee
schemes establishes that “each Member State shall ensure that within its territory
one or more deposit-guarantee schemes are introduced and o¢cially recognized” (art.
3), and that “deposit-guarantee schemes... shall cover the deposits at branches set
up by credit institutions in other Member States” (art.4).
In this paper we restrict attention to takeovers of a foreign bank by a domestic
bank in which the former becomes a branch of the latter whose deposits (like in
the European context) are insured by the domestic deposit insurance agency. The
analysis is based on a model of a bank that is supervised by an agency that cares
about closure costs plus deposit insurance payouts. The agency uses supervisory
information (which provides a signal of the future return of the bank’s assets) to
decide on the early closure of the bank. Under the principle of home country control,
the takeover moves responsibility for supervision of the foreign branch to the domestic
country.
In deciding whether to close the bank (i.e. revoke its license to operate) the
supervisor compares the current costs of closing the bank with the expected future
costs of a bank failure. Since the returns of the domestic and the foreign assets are
not perfectly correlated, the takeover increases the current costs by more than the
expected future costs. Hence diversi…cation makes the domestic supervisor softer
with the international bank than with the original domestic bank. This e¤ect leads
2to a more than proportional increase in the market value of the domestic bank (which
depends on the probability that the bank will remain open). A takeover will then
take place if this increase in the market value of the domestic bank is greater than
the market value of the foreign bank. This will be the case when the foreign bank is a
small bank in the foreign country (so it is not “too big to fail”), and/or its investments
are riskier than those of the domestic bank (so the takeover e¤ectively increases the
probability that these riskier returns will be realized).
Since depositors are assumed to be fully insured, it follows that domestic (foreign)
social welfare prior to the takeover is simply the sum of the market value of the
domestic (foreign) bank and the expected utility of the domestic (foreign) supervisor.
In the case of the foreign country, the owners of the foreign bank are compensated
by the owners of the domestic bank (otherwise they would not be willing to sell),
so a su¢cient condition for the takeover to be welfare improving is that it increases
the expected utility of the foreign supervisor. This will obtain whenever the foreign
deposit insurance premium is below its fair level (in particular, for large and/or risky
foreign banks). As for the domestic country, it is also the case that a su¢cient
condition for a welfare gain is that it increases the expected utility of the domestic
supervisor, which will typically happen as a result of the diversi…cation of the returns
of the bank.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of the domestic
and the foreign bank and characterizes the closure policies of domestic and the for-
eign supervisor. Section 3 assumes that the domestic bank buys the foreign bank,
and characterizes the closure policy of the domestic supervisor with regard to the
international bank. Section 4 discusses the e¤ects of the takeover on the probability
of bank failures. Section 5 analyzes the determinants of international takeovers (in
particular under what conditions the market value of the international bank will be
greater than the sum of the market values of the domestic and the foreign bank).
Section 6 looks at the welfare e¤ects of the takeover for the domestic and the foreign
country. Finally, Section 7 o¤ers a few concluding remarks.
32 The Model
2.1 The Domestic Bank
Consider a discrete time, in…nite horizon model of a bank that receives from a gov-
ernment agency a license to operate at an initial date t = 0: The agency supervises
the bank and has the authority to withdraw the license and close the bank at any
date. This will happen when either the bank is revealed to be insolvent, that is when
the value of its assets is smaller than the value of its deposits, or when the agency
observes some negative information about the future return of the bank’s assets.
At any date t = 0;1;2;::: in which it remains open, the bank raises an amount of
deposits which is normalized to 1: These funds are invested in an asset that yields an






with probability 1 ¡ p
; (1)
where E(e R) = pR > 1: The asset can also be liquidated at the intermediate date
t +
1
2. The liquidation value of the asset is L 2 (0;1):
Deposits pay an interest rate that is normalized to zero, and are fully insured by a
deposit insurance corporation. The corporation charges a ‡at-rate deposit insurance
premium Á: This premium is paid at date t by the owners of the bank. To simplify
the presentation, we assume that, apart from this payment, the bank owners do not
contribute any additional funds, so the investment in the risky asset is equal to the
amount of deposits.
After the investment is made, the supervisory agency observes at date t +
1
2 a
signal s 2 [0;1] that contains information about e R: In particular, it is assumed that





with probability 1 ¡ s
: (2)
From the point of view of date t the supervisory information is a random variable e s;
with cumulative distribution function F(s) and density function f(s): Notice that for
(2) to be consistent with (1) we require E(e s) =
R 1
0 s dF(s) = p:
Following the observation of the signal s; the supervisor decides whether to close
the bank or leave it open. We assume that the supervisor is risk neutral and that her
4objective function coincides with that of the deposit insurance corporation, namely
to minimize expected total costs.1 These costs comprise the compensation paid to
depositors as well as a closure cost c that capturesthe negative externalities associated
with a bank failure (in particular, via contagion to other banks).
According to this, if the bank is closed at date t+
1
2 the supervisor incurs a total
cost 1¡L+c; where 1¡L is the net payment to depositors (recall that the liquidation
value of the asset is L); and c is the closure cost. On the other hand, if the bank
stays open it will fail with probability 1 ¡ s; in which case the supervisor incurs a
total cost 1 + c:2 Hence the supervisor’s policy is to close the bank if
1 ¡ L + c < (1 ¡ s)(1 + c):
Solving for s in this expression gives the following result.





such that the supervisor will close the bank at date t +
1
2 if s < b s:
It should be noticed that the critical value b s is increasing in L and decreasing
in c: This means that the supervisor will be softer with banks which have lower
liquidation values, and with banks whose failure entails large closure costs. Since one
would expect large banks to be characterized by large c’s,3 this implies a “too big to
fail” result: large banks would be treated by the supervisor with more leniency than
smaller banks.




z0 = Pr(s < b s) = F(b s): (4)
Similarly, the probability that the bank will fail at date t + 1 is
z1 = Pr(s ¸ b s and e R = 0) = Pr(e R = 0 j s ¸ b s)Pr(s ¸ b s) =
Z 1
b s
(1 ¡ s) dF(s): (5)
1This corresponds to what Mailath and Mester (1994) called a “cost-minimizing regulator.”
2Notice that we are implicitly assuming that the supervisor is “myopic” in that she does not take
into account the future costs associated with keeping the bank open. We will come back to this issue
below.
3Recall that the volume of deposits is normalized to 1; so this is equivalent to saying that closure
costs increase more than proportionately with the size of the bank’s balance sheet.
5From (4) and (5) it follows that the probability that the bank will be closed at date
t + 1
2 or fail at date t+ 1 is




Using these expressions we can compute the e¤ect on these probabilities of an
increase in the critical value b s that characterizes the closure policy of the supervisor.
dz0
db s
= f(b s) > 0;
dz1
db s
= ¡(1 ¡ b s)f(b s) < 0;
d(z0 + z1)
db s
= b sf(b s) > 0:
Hence a tougher closure policy increases the probability that the bank will be closed
at date t + 1
2; and decreases the probability that the bank will fail at date t + 1:
Moreover, the …rst e¤ect is larger than the second, so the probability 1¡z0¡z1 that
the bank owners will receive the return R ¡1 at date t + 1 is decreasing in b s:
Under risk neutrality, the market value of the bank at any date t in which it
remains open, denoted by V; satis…es the equation
V = ¡Á + (1 ¡ z0 ¡ z1)(R ¡ 1 + V ):
The …rst term in the right hand side is the deposit insurance premium paid by the
bank owners at date t, and the second term is their expected return at date t+1: with
probability z0 + z1 they will get 0 and lose the bank’s license, and with probability
1¡z0 ¡z1 they will get R¡1 plus the value V of the bank at date t+1: Solving for
V in this equation then gives
V =
(1 ¡ z0 ¡z1)(R ¡ 1) ¡Á
z0 + z1
: (6)
Notice that V is the value of the bank’s charter (the net present value of the rents
that the bank owners will obtained as long as the bank stays open), which in this
model is endogenous.4
Similarly, the discounted expected utility of the supervisor at any date t in which
the bank remains open, denoted by U; satis…es the equation
U = Á ¡ z0(1 ¡ L + c) ¡ z1(1 + c) + (1 ¡ z0 ¡ z1)U:
4This approach to endogenizing charter values is taken from Suarez (1994). On the role of charter
values in banking see also Keeley (1990).
6The …rst term in the right hand side is the deposit insurance premium paid by the
bank owners at date t, the second term is the expected total cost incurred by the
supervisor if she closes the bank at date t + 1
2; the third term is her expected total
cost if the bank fails at date t+1; and the last term takes into account that fact that
with probability 1 ¡ z0 ¡ z1 the bank will stay open and the supervisor will get the
discounted expected utility U: Solving for U in this equation then gives
U =
Á ¡ z0(1 ¡ L + c) ¡ z1(1 + c)
z0 + z1
=
Á ¡ z0(1 ¡ L) ¡ z1
z0 + z1
¡ c: (7)
The deposit insurance premium Á is said to be “fair” if it is equal to the expected
compensation paid to depositors, that is if
Á = z0(1 ¡L) + z1:
Notice that, by (7), in the case of fair premia the discounted expected utility of the
supervisor is simply ¡c.
However, in the real world deposit insurance premia are not typically fair. Rather,
they are set with reference to the average riskiness of the banks in the country, so
riskier banks will in fact be subsidized by safer banks. For this reason, in the analysis
that will be carried out below we will assume that Á is a constant.
So far we have implicitly assumed that the supervisor is “myopic” in that she does
not take into account the future costs associated with keeping the bank open. If the
supervisor were non-myopic, its discounted expected utility would be
U
0 = Á ¡ E[minf1 ¡ L + c;(1 ¡ s)(1 + c) ¡sU
0g]:





1 + c + U0:
Let z0
0 and z0
1 denote the corresponding probabilities that the bank will be closed by
the supervisor at date t+
1











Hence in the case of fair premia we would have U0 = ¡c and b s0 = L: On the other
hand, if the deposit insurance premium is set to cover also the closure costs, so U0 = 0;
7we would have b s0 = b s: At any rate, in what follows we will continue to assume that
the supervisor is myopic.
Since the depositors are fully insured, they always get 0 in net terms, so in our
model social welfare, denoted by W; is simply the sum of the expected utilities of the
bank owners and the supervisor, that is
W = V + U: (8)
We will use this expression in Section 6 in order to assess the welfare e¤ects for the
domestic country of a takeover of a foreign bank by the domestic bank.
2.2 The Foreign Bank
Consider now a foreign bank that at any date t = 0;1;2;::: in which it remains open
raises an amount ¸ of deposits. We assume that ¸ < 1; so the foreign bank is smaller
than the domestic bank. These funds are invested in a foreign asset that yields an iid







with probability 1 ¡ p¤ ; (9)
where E(e R¤) = p¤R¤ > 1: Moreover, e R¤ and e R are independent. The foreign asset
can be liquidated at date t+
1
2, and its liquidation value is ¸L¤ 2 (0;¸):
Foreign deposits pay an interest rate that is normalized to zero, and are fully
insured by a foreign deposit insurance corporation. The corporation charges a ‡at-
rate deposit insurance premium Á
¤ per unit of deposits. As in the case of the domestic
bank, we assume that the premium ¸Á
¤ is paid at date t by the owners of the foreign
bank.
There is a foreign supervisor that observes at date t +
1
2 a signal s¤ 2 [0;1] that








with probability 1 ¡ s¤ : (10)
From the point of view of date t the supervisory information is a random variable e s¤;
with cumulative distribution function F¤(s¤) and density function f¤(s¤):5
5Notice that since e R¤ and e R are independent, it must be the case that e s¤ and e s are also
independent.
8After observing the signal s¤; the foreign supervisor decides whether to close the
bank or leave it open. Assuming, as before, that the supervisor is risk neutral and
that her objective function coincides with that of the deposit insurance corporation,
we could follow the same steps as in the previous section to prove the analogue of




1 + c¤ (11)
below which the foreign supervisor would close the bank.
As in the case of the domestic bank, we can compute the probability that the
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The market value of the foreign bank at any date t in which it remains open,




























This expression will be used in Section 6 to assess the welfare e¤ects for the foreign
country of a takeover of the foreign bank by the domestic bank.
3 The International Bank
In this section we suppose that the domestic bank buys the foreign bank, which now
becomes a branch (not a subsidiary) of the domestic bank. The resulting international
9bank raises 1 unit of deposits in the domestic market and ¸ units in the foreign market
at each date t in which it remains open. These funds are invested in a portfolio of
domestic and foreign assets that yields a random return e R + ¸e R¤ at date t + 1: If
the bank is liquidated at date t +
1
2 the liquidation value of the bank’s portfolio is
L + ¸L¤:
The …nal return of the international bank at date t+ 1 can then take four values:
R+¸R¤;R; ¸R¤; and 0: Clearly we have R+ ¸R¤ > R > 0 and R+¸R¤ > ¸R¤ > 0;
but in principle we could have R 7 ¸R¤: In what follows we will assume that ¸ is
small enough so as to ensure that
R ¸ 1 + ¸ > ¸R
¤: (17)
This means that the international bank will fail at date t+1 if and only if its invest-
ments in the domestic country do not succeed.
Under the assumption of home country control, the domestic authorities supervise
the international bank and insure all its deposits (including the foreign deposits).
Furthermore, we assume that the domestic deposit insurance corporation charges the
international bank the same premium Á per unit of deposits than it charged the
domestic bank. The rationale for this assumption is that the takeover of the foreign
bank by the domestic bank may not signi…cantly a¤ect the average riskiness of the
banks based in the domestic country.6 As before, the premium (1 + ¸)Á is paid at
date t by the owners of the international bank.
The domestic supervisor observes at date t+
1
2 the signal s on e R: However, because
of geographical distance, lack of familiarity with the business, accounting, and legal
practices in the foreign country, etc. this supervisor is not able to observe the signal
s¤ on e R¤:7 We also assume that when deciding whether to close the international
bank, the domestic supervisor only takes into account the closure cost c incurred in
the domestic country. To be sure, the closure cost c¤ is still incurred in the foreign
country, but the domestic supervisor ignores it when deciding whether to close the
international bank.
6In addition, we do not want mergers to be driven by changes in deposit insurance premia.
7A less restrictive assumption would be that the domestic supervisor observes a signal on e R¤ that
is noisier than the signal s¤ received by the foreign supervisor prior to the takeover. This would
considerably complicate the analysis, but the qualitative results would be essentially unchanged.
10We are now ready to characterize the closure policy of the domestic supervisor
with regard to the international bank. Consider her decision problem after she has
observed the signal s: If the international bank is closed at date t + 1
2 she incurs a
total cost 1¡L+¸(1¡L¤)+c; where 1¡L is the net payment to domestic depositors,
¸(1¡L¤) is the net payment to foreign depositors, and c is the domestic closure cost.
On the other hand, if the bank stays open it will fail at date t + 1 when e R = 0; in
which case the domestic supervisor will incur a total cost 1+¸+c; when e R¤ = 0; and
1+¸(1¡R¤)+c; when e R¤ = R¤: Since the supervisor does not observe the signal s¤;
and Pr(e R¤ = R¤) = p¤; in expected terms this cost is equal to 1 + ¸(1 ¡ p¤R¤) + c:
Hence the policy of the domestic supervisor is to close the international bank if
1 ¡ L + ¸(1 ¡ L
¤) + c < (1 ¡s)[1 + ¸(1 ¡ p
¤R
¤) + c]; (18)
which leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 There exists a critical value
s =
L ¡ ¸(p¤R¤ ¡ L¤)
1 + c ¡ ¸(p¤R¤ ¡ 1)
(19)
such that the domestic supervisor will close the international bank at date t + 1
2 if
s < s: Moreover s < b s:
Proof By (17) we have 1+¸ > ¸R¤; which implies 1+ ¸(1¡p¤R¤)+c > 0: Hence
solving for s in (18) proves the …rst part of the proposition. Next by (19) and (3) it




¤)(1 + c) > (p
¤R
¤ ¡ 1)L:




¤)(1 + c) > (p
¤R
¤ ¡ 1)(1 + c) > (p
¤R
¤ ¡ 1)L;
so we conclude that s < b s.¥
Hence the domestic supervisor is softer with the international bank than with the
original domestic bank. The reason for this key result is the following. The takeover
of the foreign bank by the domestic bank increases the costs of closing the bank at
11date t +
1
2 by ¸(1 ¡ L¤); and reduces the expected costs of failure at date t + 1 by
(1 ¡ s)¸(p¤R¤ ¡ 1);8 so now the supervisor is more inclined to keep the bank open.
In Figure 1 we represent the equations that determine b s (with dashed lines) and s
(with solid lines). The takeover moves the costs of closing and the expected costs of
not closing the bank at date t +
1
2 in the direction of the arrows, so s moves to the
left of b s:
[FIGURE 1]
Moreover, it is clear from (19) that as ¸ goes to zero, the e¤ect of the takeover
on the behavior of the domestic supervisor becomes smaller and smaller, and in the
limit we have lim¸!0s = b s:
The probability that the international bank will be closed at date t + 1
2 is given
by
z0 = Pr(s < s) = F(s): (20)
Similarly, the probability that the international bank will fail at date t + 1 is
z1 = Pr(s ¸ s and e R = 0) =
Z 1
s
(1 ¡ s) dF(s): (21)
Hence the probability that the international bank will be closed at date t +
1
2 or fail
at date t + 1 is




To compute the market value of the international bank at any date t in which it
remains open, denoted by V ; observe that the bank owners pay the deposit insurance
premium (1+¸)Á at date t; and will receive a positive payo¤ plus the value V of the
bank at date t + 1 when s ¸ s and e R = R. This payo¤ will be R ¡ (1 + ¸); when
e R = 0; and R+¸R¤¡(1+¸); when e R¤ = R¤: Since Pr(s ¸ s and e R = R) = 1¡z0¡z1
and Pr(e R¤ = R¤) = p¤; we conclude that the market value of the international bank
satis…es the equation
V = ¡(1 + ¸)Á+ (1 ¡ z0 ¡ z1)[R + ¸p
¤R
¤ ¡ (1 + ¸) + V ];
8Recall that we are assuming p¤R¤ > 1:
12which gives
V =
(1 ¡ z0 ¡ z1)[R + ¸p¤R¤ ¡ (1 + ¸)] ¡ (1 + ¸)Á
z0 + z1
: (22)
To sum up, in this section we have characterized the behavior of the domestic
supervisor that is responsible for the international bank resulting from the takeover
of the foreign bank by the domestic bank. In particular, we have shown that this
supervisor is softer with the international bank than with the original domestic bank.
Moreover, we have computed the market value of the international bank. These
results will be used to discuss the determinants and the welfare e¤ects of interna-
tional takeovers in banking. As a preliminary step we …rst …nd out its e¤ects on the
probability of bank failures.
4 The E¤ects on the Probability of Bank Failures
In this section we compare the probabilities that the international bank will be closed
at date t+
1
2 or fail at date t+1 with the corresponding probabilities for the domestic
and the foreign bank prior to the takeover.
In the previous section we have shown that the critical value s below which the
domestic supervisor will close the international bank at date t+
1
2 is smaller that the
critical value b s below which it closed the domestic bank. Hence by (20) and (4) this
implies
z0 = F(s) < F(b s) = z0; (23)
so the probability that the international bank will be closed at date t + 1
2 is smaller
than the corresponding probability for the domestic bank. On the other hand, by




(1 ¡ s) dF(s) >
Z 1
b s
(1 ¡ s) dF(s) = z1; (24)
so the probability that the international bank will fail at date t + 1 is greater than
the corresponding probability for the domestic bank. However since
z0 + z1 = 1 ¡
Z 1
s
s dF(s) < 1 ¡
Z 1
b s
s dF(s) = z0 + z1; (25)
the …rst e¤ect is larger than the second. In particular, this means that the probability
that the owners of the international bank will receive a positive payo¤ and keep the
13bank open at date t+1 is larger than the corresponding probability for the domestic
bank.
Next we compare the closure policy of the domestic supervisor with regard to
the international bank with the closure policy of the foreign supervisor prior to the
takeover. The probability of closure of the international bank at date t+
1
2 is smaller
than the corresponding probability for the foreign bank if











1 + c¤ = b s
¤
and F = F ¤: On the other hand, if either b s¤ < b s; or if F is dominated by F¤ in the
sense of …rst order stochastic dominance, z0 may be larger than z¤
0. The …rst case
happens when c¤ is relatively large, that is when the foreign bank is a large bank in
the foreign country, so the foreign supervisor will be less inclined to close it at date
t +
1
2: The second case happens when p < p¤; that is when the investments of the
foreign bank have a higher probability of success.9 Moreover, these two e¤ects are
more likely to make z0 > z¤
0 when s is close to b s; in particular when ¸ (the relative
size of the foreign bank) is small. Hence we conclude that z0 will be smaller than z¤
0
unless the foreign bank is a large bank in the foreign country that is small relative to
the domestic bank, and its investments are safer than those of the domestic bank.














z0 + z1 = 1 ¡
Z 1
s











unless the foreign bank is large (relative to the foreign market) and safe (relative to
the domestic bank), and the domestic bank is large (relative to the foreign bank).




9Recall that if F is dominated by F¤ in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance, we have
E(e s) = p < p¤ = E(e s¤):
14and similarly forF¤(s¤): Observe thatF(0) = 0 and F(1) = 1: Moreoverone can easily
check that E(e s) = p: We take p = :90 and c = :10; and compute z0 + z1 ¡ (z¤
0 + z¤
1);
that is the change in the probability of failure of the foreign bank after the takeover,
for p¤ = :85; :90; and :95; c¤ = 0; :10; and :40; and ¸ = :10; and :25:10 Table 1 shows
the results.
TABLE 1: Change in the probability of failure of the foreign bank
(z0 + z1 ¡(z¤
0 + z¤
1))
Panel A: ¸ = :10
p¤ = :85 p¤ = :90 p¤ = :95
c¤ = 0 ¡:163 ¡:039 +:058
c¤ = :10 ¡:104 ¡:008 +:061
c¤ = :40 ¡:051 +:010 +:061
Panel B: ¸ = :25
p¤ = :85 p¤ = :90 p¤ = :95
c¤ = 0 ¡:169 ¡:046 +:051
c¤ = :10 ¡:111 ¡:015 +:054
c¤ = :40 ¡:058 +:003 +:054
All the numbers in the …rst column of both panels are negative, which means
that if the foreign bank is riskier than the domestic bank (p¤ = :85 < :90 = p), the
probability that the bank is closed at date t +
1
2 or fails at date t + 1 goes down.
Conversely, all the numbers in the third column of both panels are positive. It can
also be seen how an increase in the foreign closure cost c¤; which proxy the size of the
foreign bank in the foreign market, reduces z¤
0 + z¤
1 and hence increases the numbers
in each row. Finally, comparing the numbers in Panel A with those in Panel B we
conclude that an increase in the relative size of the foreign bank (an increase in ¸)
reduces the di¤erence z0 + z1 ¡ (z¤
0 + z¤
1):
It should also be noticed that for p¤ = :90 and c¤ = :10 we have z¤
0 + z¤
1 = z0 + z1
(since p = :90 and c = 0:10): Hence the takeover of the foreign bank reduces the
10The other parameter values are as follows: L = L¤ = :75; and R = R¤ = 1:5:
15probability of failure of the domestic bank by .8% when ¸ = :10 and by 1.5% when
¸ = :25:
Since by (6), (14), and (22) the market values V; V ¤; and V of the domestic, the
foreign, and the international bank are decreasing in z0 + z1; z¤
0 + z¤
1; and z0 + z1;
respectively, the results in this section help to identify the key factors in the analysis
of international takeovers in banking that will be discussed in the following section.
5 The Determinants of International Takeovers
In this section we analyze under what conditions the market value of the international
bank is greaterthat the sumof the market values of the domestic and the foreign bank.
This is a necessary (and, in the absence of regulatory constraints, also a su¢cient)
condition for the takeover of the foreign bank by the domestic bank.
Using (6), (14), and (22), and rearranging gives
V ¡ (V + V



































By (25) we have z0 +z1 < z0+z1; so the …rst term on the right hand side is positive.
The second term is also positive as long as z0+z1 < z¤
0 +z¤
1; which by our discussion
in the previous section requires that the foreign bank be not too large (relative to the
foreign market) or too safe (relative to the domestic bank), and that the domestic
bank be not too large (relative to the foreign bank). The third term is alwaysnegative.
Finally, the fourth term is negative (positive) if the deposit insurance premium in the
domestic country, Á; is greater (smaller) than the premium in the foreign country, Á
¤.
Three analytical results can be immediately derived from this expression. First,
since the domestic supervisor does not care about the closure cost incurred in the
16foreign country, c¤ only appears in z¤
0 + z¤
1; and we can compute
@[V ¡ (V + V ¤)]
@c¤ = ¸(R
























(1 + c¤)2 < 0;
so we conclude that a higher closure cost c¤ reduces the di¤erence V ¡(V +V ¤); and
hence makes the takeover less likely. Second, since the deposit insurance premium in
the foreign country Á
¤ only enters in the fourth term of (26) we can also compute








Hence a higher foreign deposit insurance premium Á
¤ increases the likelihood of a
takeover of the foreign bank by the domestic bank. Finally, we can easily compute














so a higher domestic deposit insurance premium Á makes the takeover less likely.
These results are formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The takeover of the foreign bank by the domestic bank is more likely
to happen the lower the foreign closure cost c¤ and the domestic deposit insurance
premium Á; and the higher the foreign deposit insurance premium Á
¤:
According to this result, target banks are expected to be small banks located in
countries with relatively high deposit insurance premia.
Analytical results for other key parameters of the model, in particular the prob-
abilities p and p¤ of success of the investments of the domestic and the foreign bank
and the relative size ¸ of the foreign bank, are more di¢cult to obtain. For this
reason, we will present some numerical results using the parameterization introduced
in the previous section. Table 2 shows the values of V ¡ (V + V ¤) for p = :90 and
17c = :10; and for p¤ = :85; :90; and :95; c¤ = 0; :10; and :40; and ¸ = :10; and :25: The
numbers are computed assuming that the deposit insurance premium Á is fair for the
domestic bank prior to the takeover, and that Á
¤ = Á (so it is also fair for the foreign
bank when p¤ = :90 and c¤ = :10):
TABLE 2: Di¤erence between the market value of the international bank and
the sum of the market values of the domestic and the foreign bank
(V ¡ (V + V ¤))
Panel A: ¸ = :10
p¤ = :85 p¤ = :90 p¤ = :95
c¤ = 0 +:257 +:211 ¡:208
c¤ = :10 +:217 +:141 ¡:247
c¤ = :40 +:157 +:082 ¡:254
Panel B: ¸ = :25
p¤ = :85 p¤ = :90 p¤ = :95
c¤ = 0 +:566 +:449 ¡:601
c¤ = :10 +:466 +:274 ¡:698
c¤ = :40 +:315 +:126 ¡:715
All the numbers in the …rst and the second column of both panels (where p¤ · p)
are positive, and all the numbers in the third column (where p¤ > p) are negative,
which means that the takeover of the foreign bank by the domestic bank will take
place unless the investments of the former are su¢ciently safer than the investments
of the latter. As stated in Proposition 3, an increase in the foreign closure cost c¤;
which proxy the size of the foreign bank in the foreign market, reduces the di¤erence
V ¡ (V + V ¤); and hence makes the takeover less likely. Finally, comparing the
numbers in Panel A with those in Panel B we can see that an increase in ¸ increases
the di¤erence V ¡ (V + V ¤) in the …rst two columns and decreases it in the third.
Hence we conclude that the e¤ect of the relative size of the two banks on the likelihood
of a takeover is ambiguous.
Summing up, in this section we have shown that the takeover of the foreign bank
by the domestic bank is more likely to happen if the foreign bank is small (relative
18to the foreign market) and its investments are riskier than those of the domestic
bank, and if deposit insurance premia are lower in the domestic country. Moreover,
the numerical results suggest that the relative riskiness of the two banks is the key
determinant of international takeovers in banking.
6 The E¤ects on Welfare
This section discusses the welfare e¤ects for the domestic and the foreign country of
the takeover of the foreign bank by the domestic bank. Obviously, this requires to
restrict attention to situations in which V > V +V ¤; so the domestic bank will want
to buy the foreign bank.
To analyze the welfare e¤ects of the takeover for the foreign country we have
to compare social welfare before and after the takeover. Following our discussion in





P is the price paid by the domestic bank to the owners of the foreign bank, and U
¤
is the discounted expected utility of the foreign supervisor after the takeover. Taking
into account the fact that after the takeover the foreign deposit insurance corporation
does not charge the deposit insurance premium Á
¤ nor she pays any compensation to
depositors, it is clear from (15) that U
¤
= ¡¸c¤:
Since P > V ¤ (otherwise the owners of the foreign bank would not want to sell),






















In other words, the foreign country will be better o¤ if the deposit insurance premium
Á
¤ is below its fair level. Using (12), (13), and (11) one can show that
@[z¤




1 + c¤b s
¤2f(b s
¤) > 0;
and we also expect z¤
0(1¡L¤)+z¤
1 to be higher for riskier banks, so we conclude that
the takeover of a large and risky foreign bank will in general increase the welfare of
the foreign country.
19Table 3 illustrates these results for the parameterization introduced in Section 4.
As before, we assume that the deposit insurance premium Á
¤ is fair for p¤ = :90 and
c¤ = :10: Moreover we take ¸ = :25:




p¤ = :85 p¤ = :90 p¤ = :95
c¤ = 0 +:029 ¡:002 ¡:216
c¤ = :10 +:040 0 ¡:227
c¤ = :40 +:070 +:008 ¡:228
From Table 2 we know that the domestic bank will take over the foreign bank for
p¤ = :85 and p¤ = :90; in which case the price P paid by the domestic bank to the
owners of the foreign bank will be greater than the market value V ¤ of the foreign
bank prior to the takeover. Since all the numbers in the …rst column of Table 3 are
positive, and the numbers in the second column are either positive or, in the case of
the value corresponding to c¤ = 0; very small compared to the corresponding value
in Table 2, we conclude that the takeover increases the welfare of the foreign country.
Interestingly, the numbers in the third column of Table 3 are negative, and relatively
large in absolute value, but we know that in this case the takeover will not take place.
To analyze the welfare e¤ects of the takeover for the domestic country we have
to compare social welfare before and after the takeover. Following our discussion in
Section 2, the former is given by W = V + U; while the latter is W = (V ¡ P) + U,
where V ¡ P is the di¤erence between the market value of the international bank
and price paid to the owners of the foreign bank, and U is the discounted expected
utility of the domestic supervisor after the takeover. To compute U, notice that
the analysis in Section 3 implies that with probability z0 the foreign supervisor will
incur a cost 1 ¡ L+ ¸(1 ¡L¤) + c, and with probability z1 her expected cost will be
1 + ¸(1 ¡ p¤R¤) + c; so U satis…es the equation
U = (1 + ¸)Á ¡z0[1 ¡L + ¸(1 ¡L
¤) + c] ¡z1[1 + ¸(1 ¡p
¤R
¤) + c] + (1 ¡ z0 ¡ z1)U:
Solving for U and rearranging then gives
U =
[Á ¡ z0(1 ¡ L) ¡ z1] + ¸[Á ¡ z0(1 ¡L¤) ¡ z1(1 ¡ p¤R¤)]
z0 + z1
¡ c: (27)
20Since V ¡ P > V (otherwise the owners of the domestic bank would not want to
buy), a su¢cient condition for the takeover to be welfare improving for the domestic
country is that U ¸ U. Using (7) and (27) this will hold if
Á ¡ z0(1 ¡L) ¡z1
z0 + z1
¸
Á ¡ z0(1 ¡ L) ¡ z1
z0 + z1
and
Á ¸ z0(1 ¡ L
¤) + z1(1 ¡p
¤R
¤):


















and by (23), (24) and (25) we have z0 + z1 < z0 + z1 and z1=z0 > z1=z0 (so the …rst
term is positive and the second is negative). On the other hand, since p¤R¤ > 1; the
second condition will be satis…ed if Á ¸ z0(1¡L¤); which holds as long as the deposit
insurance premium Á is not too small.11
Given this ambiguity, we will resort to a numerical illustration for the parameter-
ization introduced in Section 4. Table 4 shows the change in the discounted expected
utility of the domestic supervisor for p = :90 and c = :10; and for p¤ = :85; :90; and
:95; and ¸ = :10; and :25:
TABLE 4: Change in the discounted expected utility of the domestic supervisor
(U ¡U)
p¤ = :85 p¤ = :90 p¤ = :95
¸ = :10 +:095 +:101 +:107
¸ = :25 +:262 +:280 +:298
Since all the numbers in the …rst and the second column of Table 4 (which corre-
spond to the cases where the takeover will take place) are positive, we conclude that
the takeover is also welfare increasing for the domestic country.
Hence we have shown that, at least for a reasonable set of parameter values, the
takeover of the foreign bank by the domestic bank will increase the welfare of both
countries.
11In particular, if Á = z0(1 ¡ L) + z1 (the case of fair premia) and L = L¤; z1 > 0 and z0 > z0
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